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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1977, Congress enacted the Public Works Employment Act," the
first federal statute of general application containing an explicit racial
classification. The Act, designed to pump four billion dollars of federal
funds into a flagging economy, contained a provision which ensured that
ten percent of that amount would be allocated to business enterprises
owned by United States citizens who were "Negroes, Spanish-speaking,
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts."2 Three years later, in Fullilove
v. Klutznick,3 the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the
Act by a vote of six to three.
Coming after the Court's decision in Regents of the University of Cali-
f Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Prior to joining the Yale faculty, the author was Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights in the Carter Administration. In that capacity, he represented the
United States before the Supreme Court in its successful defense of the minority set-aside program
that is the focus of this Article. The author would like to thank the Yale Law School for its support in
the preparation of this Article, his colleagues at Yale, especially Harry H. Wellington, for their
thoughtful and constructive suggestions, and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations for their sponsor-
ship of the Rutgers Civil Rights Law Conference at which he presented a very early version of this
Article.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (codified in significant part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6705(e)-
6707(j) (1982)).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-28 § 103(0(2), 91 Stat. 116, 117 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2)
(1982)).
3. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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fornia v. Bakke,4 from which no clear constitutional standard could easily
be derived, 5 Fullilove was widely regarded by proponents of affirmative
action as an important and positive development. The Fullilove Court un-
equivocally upheld Congress' power to use race-conscious remedies in its
effort to eradicate the effects of past and present racial discrimination and
to prevent the recurrence of that discrimination. .The Court directly repu-
diated claims that affirmative action was merely "reverse discrimination"
and that the Constitution prohibits any governmental practices that violate
the principle of color-blindness. Based upon Fullilove, state and lower
federal courts have upheld a variety of affirmative action programs in ed-
ucation and employment' whose constitutionality had been unclear after
the Supreme Court's earlier decisions in Bakke and United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber.7
Since Fullilove, Congress has enacted other minority set-aside provi-
sions' and federal agencies have adopted similar policies by regulation or
practice.' Moreover, although the outcome in Fullilove turned upon the
fact that the Court was reviewing an Act of Congress, the case has been
viewed as authorization for the creation of non-federal minority set-asides.
Consequently, over the past six years, states, state agencies, counties, mu-
nicipalities, and municipal agencies have patterned programs after the
Public Works Employment Act in an effort to benefit minority
enterprises.10
4. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5. In Bakke, five Justices held that race might under some circumstances be a constitutionally
permissible admissions criterion, but divided four to one on the rationale. The four remaining Justices
did not address the constitutional question.
6. See, e.g., Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894, 900-04 (3d Cir. 1984) (upholding teacher
reassignment program); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding volun-
tary affirmative action program adopted by police department), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
7. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Weber upheld the legality, under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
of a private, race-conscious craft-training program. See infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
8. Highway Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 105(f), 96 Stat. 2097, 2100 (1983);
International Security and Development Assistance Authorizations Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-151,
97 Stat. 964, 970-71 (1983) (amending Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1961)).
9. See, e.g., Central Alabama Paving, Inc. v. James, 499 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (grant-
ing preliminary injunction restraining enforcement of Department of Transportation regulations
designed to encourage participation by minority and women owned businesses in highway construc-
tion projects).
10. The following set-asides have been the subject of reported litigation:
(a) States: The Ohio minority business enterprise statute, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 123.151 (An-
derson Supp. 1985), requires that approximately 5% of all construction contracts awarded each year
be set aside for bidding solely by minority businesses. Id. § 123.151(C)(1). It also directs that non-
minority contractors, to the extent that they subcontract, must award subcontracts totaling not less
than 5% of the aggregate value of the contract to minority subcontractors. Id. § 123.151(C)(2)(a).
The total value of subcontracts with and materials purchased from minority business enterprises must
equal at least 7% of the aggregate value of the contract. Id. § 123.151(C)(2)(b). Under the Act,
approximately 15% of the estimated total value of state contracts for insurance or for purchases of
equipment, materials, or supplies must be selected and set aside for bidding solely by minority busi-
ness enterprises. OHIO Rzv. CODE ANN. § 125.081(A) (Anderson 1984); see Ohio Contractors Ass'n
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When I argued for the United States government in Fullilove, I be-
lieved that Congress acted within constitutional limits when it enacted the
minority set-aside provision at issue there. This remains my belief. In my
estimation, however, the six to three vote in favor of the provision does not
reflect adequately the closeness of the constitutional question involved. At
the same time, the majority's holding was clearly not unreasonable. As the
government argued in defense of the set-aside, Congress had attempted for
many years prior to the Public Works Employment Act to address the
problems of minority business enterprises, as evident in hearings, commit-
tee reports, and actual legislation."' The government also argued that the
v. Kelp, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983).
Michigan's procurement policy sets interim and ultimate expenditure goals for purchases from mi-
nority and women owned businesses. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 450.772(2) (West Supp. 1986).
The ultimate goals under the Michigan statuteare 7% and 5% set-asides for minority and women
owned businesses, respectively. Id. See Michigan Road Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 571 F. Supp. 173
(E.D. Mich. 1983),
(b) State Agencies: A 30% minority set-aside requirement was imposed upon a specific Massachu-
setts construction contract. See Perini Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., No. 77-2340-MC
(D. Mass. Sept. 22, 1980). Similarly, a local Delaware transportation authority established a program
in which general contractors were required to set aside 15% of the value of their public works con-
tracts for minority entrepreneurs. Pettinaro Construction Co. v. Delaware Auth. for Regional Transit,
500 F. Supp. 559 (D. Del. 1980).
(c) Counties: Pursuant to a county ordinance, the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County,
Florida opened bidding on a contract to black-owned contracting firms only, and resolved that 50% of
the contract's value would be awarded to black subcontractors. See South Fla. Chapter of the Associ-
ated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846, 861-62 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 220 (1984). Likewise, in Pierce County, Washington, an affirmative action
plan for county public works projects required contractors to meet a goal of at least 12% minority
business enterprise participation. See Southwest Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v.
Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 111, 667 P.2d 1092, 1094 (1983). Women's business enterprises
were also covered, but no specific goals were set for these entities. Id., 667 P.2d at 1094. "Minority"
was defined to include "blacks, Hispanics, Asian Americans, native North Americans, and any other
group or individual 'found to be economically and socially disadvantaged . ' Id. at 112, 667
P.2d at 1094.
(d) Cities: A Birmingham, Alabama ordinance requires that all city construction contracts exceed-
ing $20,000 have as their goal a 15% set-aside for expenditures with bona fide minority business
enterprise contractors, subcontractors, or suppliers of goods and services. See Arrington v. Associated
Gen. Contractors of Am., 403 So. 2d 893, 897 (Ala. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 913 (1982). A
Richmond, Virginia minority set-aside plan required all contractors who were awarded construction
contracts by the city to subcontract at least 30% of the contract value to minority business enterprises.
See J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181, 182 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded,
106 S. Ct. 3327 (1986). Minority group members were defined as "[clitizens of the United States who
are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." 779 F.2d at 182 n.3. An At-
lanta, Georgia city ordinance, while containing no fixed percentages, was implemented to ensure that
20% to 35% of municipal contracts would go to minority and female owned enterprises. Minorities
were defined as Asian, Black, Hispanic, or Native American. See Georgia Branch, Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am. v. City of Atlanta, 253 Ga. 397, 397-98, 321 S.E.2d 325, 326 (1984). A San
Francisco ordinance sets aside 10% and 2% of the city's contract dollars for minority business and
women's business enterprises, respectively. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. City & County of San
Francisco, 619 F. Supp. 334, 335 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
(e) Municipal Agencies: An Oakland school district plan required bids for contracts over $100,000
to contain a commitment to use minority owned businesses for at least 25% of the dollar amount of the
total bid. See Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 662 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated
and remanded, 457 U.S. 594 (1982).
11. Brief for the Secretary of Commerce at 34-43, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)
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fast-moving nature of the 1976 and 1977 public works programs justified
the set-aside. Without some safeguard for minority businesses, the federal
funding might have disappeared before corrective measures for discrimi-
natory practices could be undertaken.1" Finally, the government stressed
the unique role of Congress in identifying and remedying racial discrimi-
nation under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 A majority of the
Court found these arguments persuasive, as I will discuss below. 4
To concede the constitutionality of Congress' actions in this regard,
however, begins rather than ends the inquiry for me. I continue to be
concerned both about the manner in which Congress enacted the Public
Works Employment Act and about the arguments that the Supreme Court
adduced to find the Act constitutional. Specifically, I find myself asking
whether Congress and the Supreme Court, in enacting and approving the
Public Works Employment Act, established standards for the formulation
and judicial review of minority set-aside programs that, constitutionality
aside, fall below those we ought to employ, given our justifiable national
sensitivity to racial classifications. These concerns multiply at the prospect
of the proliferation of minority set-aside programs at the state and local
levels even though they, too, may be fully explicable and constitutionally
permissible responses to patterns of discrimination against minority
contractors.
I am not unmindful of the controversy that these questions may pro-
voke. It may appear to some that either I have experienced a profound
conversion or that I have now resolved to acknowledge my own hypocrisy
in view of my past involvement in the defense of minority set-asides, and
that my purpose here is to undermine the legal and political support mi-
nority set-asides still enjoy. As a friend remarked, the headlines after this
Article's publication might read: "Respected Civil Rights Attorney Repu-
diates Minority Business Enterprise Set-Asides."
Let me state emphatically that nothing could be farther from my mind.
I have written this Article because I am convinced that race-conscious
remedies, such as minority set-asides, can be decisive instruments to cor-
rect America's pervasive legacy of discrimination. I am also convinced,
however, that these remedies are unlikely to enjoy long-term success, mea-
sured in programmatic, legal, or social terms, unless they are properly
designed and implemented. It is my hope that the questions I raise and
the answers I offer will promote that long-term success.
(No. 78-1007).
12. Brief for the Secretary of Commerce, supra note 11, at 42.
13. Id. at 19-26.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 55-73.
Vol. 96: 453, 1987
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II. INADEQUATE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RACE-CONSCIOUS REMEDIES IN
EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENTf
There are those who are unwilling to accept the notion that American
institutions must under certain circumstances use race explicitly to remedy
the effects of past discrimination against racial minorities and to prevent
discrimination in the future.15 Others are willing to allow the explicit use
of race only in situations where "identifiable victims" of discrimination
are compensated. The definition of "identifiable victims," however, is
often so narrow that it leaves most blacks, as a class, without redress for
the harms that this society has caused them."6 I doubt that anything I
could say in the context of this debate would cause adherents of either of
these perspectives to change their minds.
Many others, however, comprehend and accept the general principle
that race-conscious remedies are an unavoidable part of a genuine com-
mitment to equal justice. At the same time, they are not necessarily pre-
pared to allow any use of race simply because proponents of such an ap-
proach assert that it is the only way that true equality can be achieved.
1 7
Instead, I sense that they want satisfactory showings of the following: the
discriminatory practice has been defined adequately; alternatives short of
explicit reliance upon race have been canvassed and found wanting; and
any race-conscious remedy has been sufficiently limited in scope and time
to address the evil at hand without either eroding legitimate standards or
converting an interim minority preference system into a permanent, insti-
tutionalized fixture. These are showings that those of us who have urged
the adoption of race-conscious remedies ought to be able to make.
Adequate justifications for race-conscious remedies have, I believe, been
15. See, e.g., L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE (1976) (criticizing racial assignment of students
for purposes of desegregation); T. SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITVY? 37-60 (1984)
(attacking use of statistics to prove racial discrimination).
16. See, e.g., Geier v. Alexander, 593 F. Supp. 1263 (M.D. Tenn. 1984), afl'd, 801 F.2d 799
(6th Cir. 1986), in which the United States Department of Justice opposed a settlement of a long-
standing higher education desegregation case that required the State of Tennessee, over a period of
five years, to establish a special "pre-enrollment" program for 75 black college sophomores to train
and prepare them for post-graduate study in the state's professional schools. Upon completion of the
program, these students were to be admitted to the state's schools of law, veterinary medicine, den-
tistry, pharmacy, and medicine. The Reagan Administration opposed this program because the 75
black students who stood to benefit were not "actual victims" of discrimination. 593 F. Supp. at 1265.
The trial court, in approving the settlement over the Justice Department's objection, stated that it
regarded "practically all black men, women, and children in the state" as victims of Tennessee's
former dual system of higher education. Id. For a thoughtful discussion of this issue in the employ-
ment context, see Daly, Stotts' Denial of Hiring and Promotion Preferences for Nonvictims: Drain-
ing the 'Spirit' from Title VII, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 17, 96-101 (1985). See also Kennedy, Per-
suasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1327,
1337-46 (1986) for an interesting discussion of the importance of analyzing the motives of affirmative
action opponents.
17. I think this spirit is reflected, for example, in Neuborne, Observations on Weber, 54 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 546 (1979).
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provided in several areas of American life. Given the resistance to the
Brown v. Board of Education"8 decision in southern and border-state
school systems, explicit use of race for purposes of student assignment was
often unavoidable.19 Otherwise, children would have continued to attend
the racially segregated schools that Brown declared unconstitutional. Simi-
larly, where employers or unions have engaged in longstanding and per-
vasive discrimination against blacks, other racial minorities, and women,
remedies have properly extended beyond those who were directly and ex-
plicitly victimized by that discrimination." The objective has been not
only to rectify past discrimination but to prevent its recurrence. Experi-
ence has taught us that this goal can be achieved in some cases only
through the use of remedies that have this scope.
Sufficient justifications, focusing on remedying discrimination,21 have
not been so forthcoming in the area of so-called voluntary affirmative ac-
tion, in which criteria of race and sex have been used by university offi-
cials, employers, unions, and government agencies in allocating scarce re-
sources. There have been several deficiencies. First, many of these
programs have not been openly adopted and administered. Consequently,
they have not benefited from the scrutiny and testing of means to ends
assured by public deliberation. Programs that cannot survive the light of
explicit consideration are highly susceptible to abuse and unlikely to have
a stable existence. In a society in which we place such importance upon
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
20. See, e.g., Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholding remedy requiring
Alabama state police to promote one black state trooper for each white trooper promoted), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Paradise, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d
1053 (5th Cir. 1974) (racial hiring quota ordered to desegregate Mississippi highway patrol). The
recent Supreme Court decisions in Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S.
Ct. 3063 (1986), and Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986),
upholding race-conscious programs pursuant to a consent decree and a court finding of discrimination,
respectively, fit into the same pattern.
21. What I have in mind here is discrimination that can be linked to a specific institution or
industry, as opposed to what has come to be called "societal discrimination." Under the latter theory,
the pervasive consequences of racial discrimination against blacks, in particular, would validate an
institution's use of race-conscious criteria, regardless of whether the entity itself engaged in discrimi-
natory conduct. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ, of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 369-73 (1978) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part) (favoring societal discrimination approach); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1847-48 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (rejecting societal discrimina-
tion approach). Although the effects of America's history of discrimination against blacks, other mi-
norities, and women are conspicuous and widespread, I question the utility of a concept as vague as
"societal discrimination" in working out the appropriate nature, scope, and duration of race-conscious
remedies. The concept of societal discrimination proves both too much and too little: too much, be-
cause it supports the use of race-conscious remedies even when they are unnecessary, such as when
blacks, other minorities, and women are adequately represented in an institution given available pools;
too little, because it discourages the search for evidence of past discriminatory practices and for reme-
dies tailored to rectify that discrimination, such as when an institution's plan to increase minority and
female membership is woefully inadequate to correct the effects of its own past practices.
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"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 22 debate of public issues, it is diffi-
cult to justify the idea of privately adopted programs using racial criteria
to allocate resources.
Second, many race-consciousaffirmative action plans have not benefited
during their formulation from the thorough deliberation that such plans
require. Upon inspection, many plans appear to be the products of hasty
decisions to "do something." No effort was made to identify the problem
and to examine various alternative remedies, or to apply explicit racial
criteria only after other solutions were proven inadequate to the task.2"
The causes of this rush to judgment are difficult to explain. In some cases,
those involved were well-intentioned, but careless. In others, it appears
that the originators were interested, at least in part, in using a race-
conscious affirmative action plan as a preemptive strike to stave off objec-
tive inquiry into practices that might violate legal or constitutional
requirements.
24
Third, when such plans have become the subject of litigation, propo-
nents of affirmative action in general have felt compelled to defend them
in unqualified terms instead of helping the courts to develop criteria that
separate permissible from impermissible programs, differentiating the
plans that are well designed to counteract discrimination from those that
promise no such result. The manner in which these affirmative action/
reverse discrimination issues have been presented to the courts, and the
political context in which the litigation has arisen, have made some degree
of posturing understandable, even inevitable. When the question before
the court appears to demand a categorical answer to the legitimacy of the
explicit use of racial criteria, those in favor of the general principle may
see no realistic alternative to.-defending each program. And judges sympa-
thetic to race-conscious remedies in certain circumstances often seem to
share the view that baby and bathwater must stay together.
Although this attitude can be explained, it should not be condoned.
Such an approach weakens, not strengthens, the general principle of af-
firmative action. In the Bakke case, the Supreme Court considered a re-
jected white applicant's challenge to the constitutionality of a state medical
school's minority admissions program. The challenger alleged that the ad-
missions program set aside sixteen places, out of a total of one hundred,
for which only minority applicants could compete. In a highly fragmented
decision, the Supreme Court held that the admissions plan could not
22. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
23. In both employment and higher education, for example, more aggressive recruitment may
produce greater minority representation. Providing financial assistance or revising admissions require-
ments to remove elements known to disadvantage minorities also may remedy significant minority
underrepresentation.
24. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
459
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stand, but affirmed that race might, under some circumstances, be a
proper admissions criterion.
The debate over high principles in Bakke obscured the fact that the
medical school's program did not justify the vigorous defense it received,
on or off the bench. The record revealed little about why the program was
established, after what deliberations, with what ultimate purpose, and,
more specifically, why sixteen places were earmarked for minority appli-
cants.25 Instead, the Court was presented with a series of post hoc argu-
ments from the medical school's lawyers in defense of the program, along
with scores of amicus briefs hypothesizing how the challenged program
might be found to accord with federal legal and constitutional
requirements.
The Court could have concluded that, whatever the ultimate answer to
questions about the legality and constitutionality of race-conscious admis-
sions programs, the program at issue in Bakke had to fall. Our national
sensitivity to racial classifications requires that they be used only when
they represent a focused effort to remedy the effects of racial discrimina-
tion and to prevent its recurrence. Indeed, the Bakke case is particularly
frustrating because an open, considered process might have produced a
plan that would have been worth defending. The medical school faculty,
which approved the challenged program, might have identified the degree
to which its own institution had engaged in practices that unjustifiably
limited minority enrollment, and on that basis, attempted to rectify those
consequences. Perhaps the school would not have found such evidence,
and would thus have inferred that the limitations were the product of
actions by the larger university system of which it was a part.2" The an-
swer might then have been that these other institutions, not the medical
school, should have had the responsibility for initiating race-conscious af-
25. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-76. Commentators have lamented the Regents' failure to develop a
record regarding discrimination against racial minorities in California. See Bell, Bakke, Minority Ad-
missions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 3, 5-7 (1979); Bell, Introduc-
tion: Awakening After Bakke, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1979); Jones, Litigation Without
Representation: The Need for Intervention To Affirm Affirmative Action, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 31, 69-77 (1979); Smith, Reflections on a Landmark Some Preliminary Observations on the
Development and Significance of Regents of the University of California v. Allan Bakke, 21 How.
L.J. 72, 94-101 (1978).
26. This case could have been made. California law required separate schools for "Negroes,
Mongolians and Indians" until 1880. Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., as Amicus Curiae, app. B at 16a, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(No. 76-811). Separate schools for Chinese, Japanese, and Indian children were mandated by Califor-
nia law until 1947. Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, supra, app. B at
17a-18a. In 1946, a California school district was found to have been operating a system that segre-
gated Mexican-American and Anglo (white) children. Mendez v. Westminster School Dist., 64 F.
Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), affld, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947). For further examples of racial
discrimination in California's primary and secondary educational system and its impact upon higher
education, see Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, supra, at 57-59, app. B at
12a-30a.
Vol. 96: 453, 1987
HeinOnline -- 96 Yale L.J. 460 1986-1987
Fullilove
firmative action programs. Instead, the Supreme Court's resolution in
Bakke suggested that educational institutions could continue to use racial
criteria in admissions as long as they did not embody "fixed quotas.
'2 7
Presumably, with this caveat, racially explicit allocation programs could
be developed and administered as before, without any attempt to identify
discriminatory practices or to frame the program in terms of any set of
specific conditions.28
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber 9 involved an explicitly race-
based on-the-job training program designed to correct racial disparities in
the petitioner's workforce. The program was the product of collective bar-
gaining between management and the union representing both white and
black employees. I am persuaded that the employer in Weber, whatever its
other motivations, hoped that the race-conscious training program would
divert attention from the fact that it had long been engaged in discrimina-
tory employment practices that violated federal law.3o The Supreme Court
27. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-19 (majority affirms that race may be used appropriately under some
circumstances in admissions process).
28. Some colleges and universities, especially those outside of the southern and border states, may
have difficulty linking persistently low representation of racial minorities to past or present intentional
discrimination. However, concepts of discriminatory impact or effect, used elsewhere in the law, see,
e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII employment action), could be a firm
basis for affirmative admissions plans in the educational context as well. Specifically, some racial and
ethnic minorities score disproportionately lower than whites on standardized tests such as the Scholas-
tic Aptitude Test (SAT), the Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT) and the Law School Admis-
sions Test (LSAT). See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPOR-
TUNITY: AFFIRMATIVE ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS AT LAW AND MEDICAL SCHOOLS 59-63 (1978);
REPORT OF THE CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, SELECTIVE AD-
MISSIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 37-38, 79-80 (1977). Because many schools rely heavily upon
scores on these tests in making admissions decisions, racial minorities are disadvantaged. Cf. D.
OWEN, NONE OF THE ABOVE 200-29 (1985) (discussing reliability of standardized tests as predictors
of academic performance); Reynolds & Brown, Bias in Mental Testing: An Introduction to the Is-
sues, in PERSPECTIVES ON BIAS IN MENTAL TESTING I (C. Reynolds & R. Brown eds. 1984)
(same). No strong correlation has been established between admissions test scores and performance in
the practice of law or medicine. Given the disparate impact of these tests, the uncertainty of their
predictive validity, and the history of systematic discrimination against certain racial and ethnic mi-
norities in the American educational system, colleges and universities would be justified in employing
special admissions criteria to reduce these discriminatory barriers to minority access. See Fallon, To
Each According to His Ability, From None According to His Race: The Concept of Merit in the Law
of Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U.L. REV. 815, 816-19 (1980). Although some institutions of higher
education may already operate such programs, two factors are often absent. First, schools should
develop plans that are responsive to their own particular situations in terms of the percentages or
goals set for minority admissions, the minority groups included in the programs, and the duration of
the special admissions efforts. Second, schools should publicize the rationales for their programs so
that details are not left to speculation.
29. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
30. The Weber case involved Kaiser Aluminum's operations in Gramercy, Louisiana. Kaiser had
already faced court challenges to its employment practices from blacks at its Baton Rouge and
Chalmette, Louisiana plants. The Baton Rouge controversy was settled by a consent decree requiring
Kaiser to pay $225,000 to the plaintiff class. Burrell v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., No. 67-86
(M.D. La. Feb. 24, 1975). In the Chalmette action, the plaintiffs were held to have established a
prima facie case of discrimination against blacks in hiring for craft positions on the basis of statistics
much like those at the Gramercy plant before the training program at issue in Weber was instituted.
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determined, however, that the challenged program, which allocated fifty
percent of the slots in a craft-training class to blacks and fifty percent to
whites, did not violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The Weber training program was the result of the collective bargaining
process, not the closed procedure apparently followed by the medical
school in Bakke. There was also some effort in the bargaining process to
identify the extent to which black workers were underrepresented in the
employer's skilled crafts and to establish a long-range goal of bringing
black representation up to the percentage of such workers in the local
workforce. Yet the Court explained only that the plan satisfied legal re-
quirements because its "purposes . . .mirror[ed] those of the statute,"
and did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employ-
ees." 31 Given the vagueness of these criteria, it is difficult to imagine their
application beyond the Weber case itself. One is left to conjecture whether
any plan would fail this test as long as its avowed purpose was to amelio-
rate the condition of black workers, and as long as it was structured to
bring black representation up to its proportion in the local labor force.
Employers may protest that they should not be required to give a thor-
ough accounting of their past discriminatory practices in the process of
developing a race-conscious affirmative action plan lest they open them-
selves to suits by black victims of those practices.3 2 One can accept this
concern, however, without conceding that employers have no responsibility
to develop affirmative action plans correlated to their past discriminatory
practices and to their realistic ability to remedy the effects of those prac-
tices. In brief, the Court in Weber should have required the employer and
union to have made a showing of past discrimination. Instead, the Court
gave blanket approval to the plan, suggesting once again that race-
conscious programs need not be well-tailored or linked in a more than
generalized fashion to existing patterns of discrimination. This ruling sup-
See Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1389-90 (5th Cir. 1978). Several
years before Kaiser Aluminum established its craft-training program, the Department of Labor had
pressured the corporation to increase its employment of blacks. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 226 (5th Cir. 1977). The Labor Department's authority in this respect derived
from Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, at 28-31
(1982), requiring non-discrimination by government contractors such as Kaiser.
31. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
32. In his Weber concurrence, Justice Blackmun suggested, properly in my estimation, "that em-
ployers and unions who had committed 'arguable violations' of Title VII should be free" to institute
voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action programs like Kaiser's without fearing challenges by
white employees. Id. at 211. I also find attractive Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Wygant v. Jack-
son Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1854-57 (1986), in which she considers the role of findings of
discrimination in assessing the constitutionality or legality of race-conscious remedies. She suggests
that while contemporaneous findings of discrimination are preferable to justify race-conscious reme-
dies, they should not be required. Rather, the institution involved should be expected only to have a
"firm basis for determining that affirmative action is warranted." Id. at 1856. This "firm basis" may
be gained by evidence of discriminatory impact. Id.
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plied yet another argument for those seeking to discredit the underlying
principle of race-conscious remedies.
III. THE CASE OF THE PUBLIC WORKS EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1977
Congress did no better than the medical school sued in Bakke, and con-
siderably worse than labor and management in Weber, in justifying the
race-conscious approach it adopted in the Public Works Employment Act
of 1977. In July 1976, Congress enacted legislation designed to alleviate
national unemployment and to stimulate the economy by distributing two
billion dollars to state and local governments for public works projects.
The legislation, entitled the Local Public Works Capital Development
and Investment Act of 1976,"3 charged the Secretary of Commerce with
the responsibility of disbursing funds through the Economic Development
Administration (EDA). The Act provided that the funds were to be avail-
able for appropriation until September 30, 1977.34
In May 1977, Congress amended the 1976 Act and authorized an addi-
tional four billion dollars for similar projects. The total of six billion dol-
lars was to be available for appropriation until December 31, 1978. 3 The
new statute, entitled the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, made
various changes in the 1976 Act, including the addition of the "minority
business enterprise" provision, which states:
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no
grant shall be made under this chapter for any local public works
project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secre-
tary that at least 10 per centum of the amount of each grant shall be
expended for minority business enterprises. For purposes of this par-
agraph, the term "minority business enterprise" means a business at
least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group members
or, in case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of
the stock of which is owned by minority group members. For the
purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group members are citi-
zens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking,
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.36
As originally proposed, the 1977 Act did not contain any provision di-
recting that a percentage of the funding be set aside for minority contrac-
tors. The minority business enterprise provision was first proposed on the
33. Pub. L. No. 94-369, §§ 101-111, 90 Stat. 999, 999-1002 (1976) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6701-10 (1982)).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 6710 (1982).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 6705(0(2).
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floor of the House of Representatives as an amendment to the Act by
Representative Parren Mitchell (D. Md.) on February 24, 1977 .3 The
House approved the amendment the same day. 8 In the Senate, Senator
Edward Brooke (R. Mass.) moved on March 10, 1977 to amend the Sen-
ate version of the Act to include a similar provision establishing a set-aside
for minority contractors. 9 The Senate bill, with the Brooke amendment,
was passed on the same day.40 After referring the two bills to conference,
both houses agreed to the Mitchell amendment. The Act was signed into
law on May 3, 1977.
The 1976 Act and the 1977 amendments contained several provisions
designed to ensure that the local public works program would have its
intended effect of providing an immediate boost to the economy generally
and to the construction industry in particular. Congress directed that no
part of any public works project funded under the statute should be per-
formed directly by any state or local government agency. Rather, all pro-
ject construction was to be performed by private contractors who submit-
ted the lowest competitive bids in response to invitations from the grantees
and who met established criteria of responsibility.41 In addition, Congress
required grant applicants to give satisfactory assurance that on-site labor
would begin within ninety days of project approval,' 2 and instructed the
Secretary of Commerce to make a final determination on each grant ap-
plication within sixty days of the application's receipt."3 Moreover, the
Act required that the federal funds be committed to state and local grant-
ees by September 30, 1977."
In accordance with the requirements of the 1976 Act, the Secretary re-
issued regulations to implement the local public works program. The reg-
ulation concerning the minority business enterprise provision reaffirmed
that no grant would be awarded unless the ten percent set-aside require-
ment was met.45 It also provided, however, that the requirement would
not be applied rigidly if the appropriate EDA official determined that the
ten percent set-aside could not be filled "by minority businesses located
within a reasonable trade area determined in relation to the nature of the
services or supplies intended to be procured."'
46
To supplement and clarify the statute and regulation, EDA issued
37. 123 CONG. REc. 5327 (1977).
38. Id. at 5332.
39. Id. at 7155-56.
40. Id. at 7156.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(e)(1) (1982).
42. Id. § 6705(d).
43. Id. § 6706.
44. Act of May 13, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-29, 91 Stat. 122.
45. 13 C.F.R. § 317.19(b)(1) (1985).
46. Id. § 317.19(b)(2).
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guidelines governing minority business participation in local public works
grants. EDA also issued a technical bulletin providing detailed instruc-
tions and information to assist grantees and their contractors in meeting
the ten percent requirement. 7 The guidelines stated that "[t]he primary
obligation for carrying out the 10% [minority business enterprise] partici-
pation requirement rests with EDA Grantees."' 8 This obligation could be
satisfied through the grantee's "own simple or prime contracts or through
the subcontracts or supply contracts of its prime contractors.""' The
guidelines required grantees to submit reports to EDA describing actual
and expected minority business participation, both before the issuance of
the first federal letter of credit and after the project was forty percent
complete. In addition, grantees had to file a statement from each partici-
pating minority firm "certifying that the minority firm is a bona fide mi-
nority business enterprise and that the minority firm has executed a bind-
ing contract to provide a specific service or material to the project for a
specific dollar amount." 50
The guidelines provided that EDA would approve a grantee's request
for a waiver of the minority business requirement if the grantee demon-
strated that "there are not sufficient, relevant, qualified minority business
enterprises whose market areas include the project location. . . ."" Recog-
nizing that a grantee might encounter difficulties in attempting to comply
with the ten percent set-aside in an area where the minority population
was small, the guidelines also permitted a grantee to "apply for a waiver
before requesting bids on its project or projects if it can show that there
are no relevant, available, qualified minority business enterprises which
could reasonably be expected to furnish services or- supply materials for
the project." 52
One can only marvel at the fact that the minority set-aside provision
was enacted into law without hearings or committee reports, and with
only token opposition.53 In this regard, the set-aside provision joins many
other federal statutes which have become law with equally barren empiri-
cal justification and without close scrutiny. Ordinarily, however, civil
47. ECONOMIC DEv. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GUIDELINES FOR ROUND II OF THE
LOCAL PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM (1977); ECONOMIC DEv. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
GUIDELINES FOR 10% MINORITY BUSINESS PARTICIPATION IN LPW GRANTS (1977) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES FOR 10% MINORITY BUSINESS PARTICIPATION]; EDA MINORITY BUSINESS ENTER.
TECHNICAL BULLETIN (1977). Certain relevant portions of the Guidelines and the Technical Bulletin
are set out in the appendix to Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492-95 app.
48. GUIDELINES FOR 10% MINORITY BUSINESS PARTICIPATION, supra note 47, at 2.
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id. at 13.
51. Id. at 14.
52. Id. at 15.
53. The Senate vote in favor of the bill was 71 to 14. 123 CONG. REC. 12,943 (1977). The House
vote was 335 to 77. Id. at 13,256-57.
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rights laws have received quite distinct treatment. Federal laws designed
to assist blacks or other racial minorities have generally not been enacted
without extensive hearings, committee deliberations in each House, con-
sideration by a conference committee, conference committee reports, and
vigorous floor debate. Moreover, none of these laws, with the exception of
the Freedmen's Bureau Act," contained explicit racial classifications.
In Fullilove, the Supreme Court voted six to three to affirm the consti-
tutionality of the 1977 Act's set-aside. Writing also for Justices White and
Powell, Chief Justice Burger concluded that Congress had constitutional
authority under the spending and commerce powers, as well as under sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enact remedial legislation di-
rected at racial discrimination.55 The Chief Justice found that over the
past two decades, Congress' efforts to solve problems associated with dis-
crimination against minority businesses provided an "abundant historical
basis" upon which it could have "reasonably determined" that such action
was necessary to ensure "equal protection of the laws."' 56 In the Chief
Justice's view, "Congress. . .may legislate without compiling the kind of
'record' appropriate with respect to judicial or administrative proceed-
ings."5  Finally, he determined that the minority set-aside provision that
Congress adopted to address this discrimination "does not violate the
Constitution.
'58
Justice Powell, who joined in the Burger opinion, wrote separately to
restate his view on the proper standard of review. Unlike the Chief Jus-
tice, Justice Powell contended that the set-aside provision had to be judged
by "the most stringent level of review" because it employed a racial classi-
fication. 59 Repeating his position in Bakke, 0 Justice Powell asserted that
the challenged provision could be upheld only if it constituted "a neces-
sary means of advancing a compelling governmental interest."61 He
granted, however, that "ameliorating the disabling effects of identified dis-
crimination" 62 would meet that standard if three other requirements were
54. Freedmen's Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173, 175 (1866) (conveying disputed lands to "heads
of families of the African race"). See generally Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REv. 753 (1985) (discussing Court's disregard of
original intent of framers' of Fourteenth Amendment). Congress included in the 1965 Voting Rights
Act, in equally summary fashion, a provision allowing persons educated in Puerto Rican schools to
vote in state elections regardless of their English literacy. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89.
110, § 4(e)(2), 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e)(2) (1982)). The
Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
55. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473-77 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
56. Id. at 478.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 492.
59. Id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. 265, 299 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
61. 448 U.S. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 497.
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also met. First, the governmental body that established the racial classifi-
cation "must have the authority to act in response to identified discrimina-
tion. ' '63 Second, that governmental body "must make findings that demon-
strate the existence of illegal discrimination."" Third, the classification
must be "equitable and reasonably necessary to the redress of identified
discrimination."6 Applying these criteria to the set-aside provision, Jus-
tice Powell found that it passed constitutional muster.66
Justice Marshall, writing also for Justices Brennan and Blackmun,
provided the other three votes that made the majority for upholding the
set-aside. In evaluating the constitutionality of the set-aside provision,
Justice Marshall invoked the test which he and three other justices had
adopted in Bakke.17 Under that test, racial classifications employed osten-
sibly for purposes of remedying past racial discrimination are constitu-
tional if they "serve important governmental objectives and are substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives."68 Furthermore, the racial
classification must have "'an important and articulated purpose for its
use,' "6 and must not be one that " 'stigmatizes any group or that singles
out those least well represented in the political process to bear the brunt
of a benign program.' "70 Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun
found it "not even a close one"71 that the minority set-aside provision
satisfied these criteria.
The efforts to delineate the appropriate test for evaluating the constitu-
tionality of racial classifications ran from Justice Powell's "strict scrutiny"
to Chief Justice Burger's "most searching examination" to Justice Mar-
shall's "substantially related to an important governmental objective."
The truth is, however, that all the members of the majority applied a
standard that fell below any of the ones upon which they claimed to
rely.7" In the absence of any significant legislative history, these Justices
looked to a variety of congressional reports, hearings, and legislation re-
lated to the general condition of minority business enterprises. On this
basis, they wrote their own post hoc rationalizations, concluding not that
63. Id. at 498.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 510.
66. Id. at 516-17.
67. 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
68. 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
69. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361).
70. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361).
71. Id.
72. Indeed, the standard resembles the "rational relationship" test the Court has applied recently
to other congressional legislation. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
174-75 (1980).
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Congress "could reasonably have" relied, but in fact that Congress did
rely, upon this societal condition in enacting the minority set-aside.
7
1
Attacking the constitutionality of the set-aside, the dissenters focused
precisely on this major defect in the historical record. Justice Stewart,
writing also for Justice Rehnquist, rejected the proposition that legisla-
tures, including Congress, were institutionally competent to develop con-
stitutionally permissible race-conscious remedies for discrimination. He
thought that they possessed "neither the dispassionate objectivity nor the
flexibility that are needed to mold a race-conscious remedy around the
single objective of eliminating the effects of past or present discrimina-
tion." 1 7 Justice Stewart assumed that only equity courts had such compe-
tence. But this Stewart/Rehnquist position cannot be squared with either
the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically section 5,
or the history of that amendment's ratification. Both point to the expecta-
tion that Congress would secure the guarantee of equal protection, espe-
cially to blacks facing racial discrimination.7 5 Moreover, this declaration
of congressional incompetence and view of court equity powers elevates
the role of the federal judiciary far beyond that envisioned by Marbury v.
Madison.7 1 In these dissenters' view, apparently, even a state trial court
judge would be constitutionally competent to order a race-conscious rem-
edy whereas the United States Congress would not.
Justice Stewart found the set-aside unconstitutional, even assuming, ar-
guendo, that Congress were competent to devise race-conscious remedies.
His evaluation of the record led him to conclude that the set-aside "was in
whole or in part designed to effectuate objectives other than the elimina-
tion of the effects of racial discrimination . . .
Justice Stevens did not join in Justice Stewart's blanket rejection of
congressionally devised race-conscious remedies. Instead, he conceded that
such approaches might be constitutional. Justice Stevens stated, however,
73. "Accordingly, Congress reasonably determined that the prospective elimination of these barri-
ers to minority firm access to public contracting opportunities generated by the 1977 Act was appro-
priate . . . " 448 U.S. at 478 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). "In my view, the legislative history of
§ 103(0(2) demonstrates that Congress reasonably concluded that private and governmental discrimi-
nation had contributed to the negligible percentage of public contracts awarded minority contractors."
Id. at 503 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). "Congress reasonably determined that race-
conscious means were necessary to break down the barriers confronting participation by minority
enterprises ...." Id. at 521 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
74. Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
75. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 126-29 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1880); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
76. The doctrine established in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that federal
courts have the power to declare what the Constitution compels, has not been interpreted to suggest
that other branches of the federal government are inherently incapable of acting on matters generally
placed within their authority by the Constitution. See, e.g., Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by
Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REv. 707, 715-16 (1985).
77. 448 U.S. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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that because "racial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for
disparate treatment, and because classifications based on race are poten-
tially so harmful to the entire body politic, it is especially important that
the reasons for any such classification be clearly identified and unques-
tionably legitimate."' 8 He took the position, therefore, that the Court had
a "special obligation to scrutinize" any such legislation as to its substance
as well as to the regularity of the process that brought it into being."9
With respect to the due process analysis, Justice Stevens concluded that
any congressional legislation that established racial classifications must be
shown to have been "adequately preceded by a consideration of less dras-
tic alternatives or adequately explained by a statement of legislative pur-
pose." 80 He thought that when Congress creates a special preference or
disability, it is constitutionally required to identify the characteristic justi-
fying the special treatment, particularly where racial classifications are
concerned.81
Applying these standards to the set-aside provision, Justice Stevens
found the racial classifications and the requirement of ten percent (as op-
posed to some other figure) neither "clearly identified" nor "unquestion-
ably legitimate."'82 Moreover, he concluded that the record reflected Con-
gress' "failure to follow procedures that guarantee the kind of
deliberation" that a statute containing a racial classification "obviously
merits."88 For these reasons, he dissented.
Although one can disagree, as do I, with Justice Stevens' conclusion
that procedural flaws in the enactment of the minority set-aside provision
rendered it unconstitutional, the force of his critique is hard to ignore. It
certainly is a source of my concerns. Even proponents of such remedies
should demand that these efforts by the federal government to assist mi-
nority contractors be the result of an open, thorough, and considered pro-
cess. Without a careful examination of the facts and alternatives, the legis-
lation may be misdirected and fail to assist those most deserving of aid,
may assist those who are able to operate without such preferences, may
harm others unjustifiably, and may operate, even under the best of cir-
cumstances, longer than necessary.84 When Congress has taken the ex-
78. Id. at 533-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
79. Id. at 548.
80. Id. at 551.
81. Id. at 553.
82. Id. at 535, 553-54.
83. Id. at 552.
84. Corruption in federally funded programs is not unusual. Charges of sham minority business
enterprises, however, have produced unusually strident criticism of set-aside programs. This reaction
may be caused in part by the belief that such programs are, by their very design, susceptible to
corruption and abuse. See, e.g., Set Set-Asides Aside, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1986, at 10-11. I
suggest, however, that these criticisms can be met effectively by care and caution in establishing set-
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traordinary step of adopting an explicit racial classification, as it did in
the Public Works Employment Act, the Court has the responsibility to
assure itself that the decision was reasoned and deliberate.
This is so not because Congress lacks the constitutional power to enact
such legislation, but because it may have enacted legislation without
proper attention to the degree that its actions may threaten "values of
permanent significance"85 in our society. One such value, albeit honored
more in the breach than in observance, is that of a "color-blind Constitu-
tion." 6 To say that the principle of a "color-blind Constitution" has been
violated and that "[imn order to get beyond racism, we must first take ac-
count of race"8 7 is not to deny that a "color-blind Constitution," and a
society in which government avoids using race to allocate benefits and
burdens among its citizenry, are the ultimate goals we seek. The Court is
in a unique position to demand that when congressional action violates the
principle of color-blindness, as the minority set-aside provision does, Con-
gress must demonstrate that it has relied on a complete record and has
acted with a full understanding of the program's implications. The
Court's purpose, therefore, is not to redirect Congress' decisions; rather,
the Court, in order to evaluate and rule in a principled manner, should
compel Congress to act in an equally principled fashion. 8
asides.
85. This phrase from Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1957) appears in the following context, which I think
bears upon my critique of Fullilove:
There is unlikely to be such an awareness in a body constituted and occupied as Congress is,
and responding quite properly to the pressures of those it is responsible to. The popular voice
which expresses without inhibition what is wanted in the way of immediate, palpable results
should be heard somewhere and Congress is that place. But Congress cannot normally be
expected also to be aware that some of the means chosen to achieve immediate ends impinge in
not easily apparent fashion on values of permanent significance. Were this not so the Consti-
tution, which embodies such values . . . could be left to the care of Congress alone. But the
Supreme Court also guards it and draws from it what is enduring.
Id. (emphasis added).
86. This phrase is traditionally credited to Justice Harlan who, in dissenting from the Court's
decision upholding racial segregation in public transportation, said:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in
achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for
all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law
regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil
rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (emphasis added). For a modern articulation of the
principle of color-blindness, see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).
87. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
88. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 164-66 (1962) (discussing Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958), where Court obliged Congress to give due reconsideration to federal rules re-
specting denial of passports to suspected subversives). But see Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55
470
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IV. POST-FULLILOVE MINORITY SET-ASIDES
Developments subsequent to Fullilove have reflected no greater atten-
tion to principled decisionmaking. At the federal level, the Department of
Transportation issued regulations in 1980 that required states to submit
plans with minimum goals for contracting with minority and women
owned business enterprises in order to be eligible for federal funds.89 In
an early constitutional challenge to these regulations, a federal trial court
took the position that such provisions could be upheld only if the agency
could show: first, that it had been given express authority by Congress to
take such action;90 second, that it had made findings of past discrimina-
tion;91 and third, that its regulatory actions were responsive to that dis-
crimination.9 2 Because the Department of Transportation was unable to
meet any of these requirements, the court issued a preliminary injunction
against implementation of the regulations.9 3
Another federal district court, however, found that the regulations were
within constitutional limits.94 Explicitly rejecting the earlier court's ap-
proach, it found that the "[p]ronouncements of the President, declarations
of policy by the Congress, findings of discrimination by the Congress and
the President regarding other similar legislation, and the findings of the
Secretary of Transportation as a result of the Notice and Comment"95
NEB. L. REv. 197, 222-44 (1976) (legislatures cannot and should not be held to standard of rational
lawmaking). Whatever the force of Linde's arguments generally, they are insufficient when the legis-
lature proposes to enact statutes establishing explicit racial classifications.
89. 49 C.F.R. § 23.45 (1980).
90. Central Alabama Paving, Inc. v. James, 499 F. Supp. 629, 636 (M.D. Ala. 1980).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 639.
93. The district court relied principally upon Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)
(Civil Service Commission regulation excluding aliens from federal service held unconstitutional be-
cause not expressly mandated by Congress or President) for the proposition that administrative agen-
cies must be "expressly empowered by Congress to impose. . . preferential classifications ...." 499
F. Supp. at 636. The Department of Transportation conceded that it had no express congressional
authority for the challenged regulations, but argued that support could be inferred from several gen-
eral statutory grants. The court rejected each of these claims, including the Department of Transpor-
tation's reliance upon Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 200d-6 (1982)
(non-discrimination in federally funded programs), because the regulations in question did not have
the required prior approval of the Attorney General. 499 F.Supp. at 638. Regarding findings of
discrimination, the court noted "the candid admissions of counsel" for the Department of Transporta-
tion that none were made prior to promulgation of the set-aside regulations. Id. at 639.
94. M.C. West, Inc. v. Lewis, 522 F. Supp. 338 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
95. Id. at 349. Despite general approval of the agency's set-aside requirements, the court in M.C.
West rejected the Department of Transportation's asserted reliance upon Title VI and four other
federal statutes for its set-aside regulations. Id. at 345-46. Instead, it found that "[a] more direct line
of authority for the Secretary's regulations comes through the Small Business Act [15 U.S.C. §
631(e)(1)(A)-(G) (1982)] and the President's Executive Orders issued pursuant thereto." Id. at 346.
For a comprehensive discussion of the Small Business Administration's minority business enterprise
program and the Central Alabama Paving and M.C. West decisions, see Drabkin, Minority Enter-
prise Development and the Small Business Administration's Section 8(a) Program: Constitutional
Basis and Regulatory Implementation, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 433 (1983).
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procedure justified the set-aside requirements. In effect, this court simply
imitated the Fullilove majority, bringing together bits and pieces to vali-
date a program for which no systematic justification had been provided.96
The first court was subsequently convinced to vacate its injunction
against the Department of Transportation's set-aside regulations on the
ground that Congress had passed legislation in the interim that explicitly
directed the Department to set aside ten percent of authorized appropria-
tions for minority business enterprises. 97 In the face of this development,
the court could no longer contend that the Department of Transportation
lacked explicit congressional authority to require state agencies to estab-
lish minimum goals for such businesses. Ironically, however, this interven-
ing set-aside provision, like its counterpart in the Public Works Employ-
ment Act, was also unsupported by congressional hearings or reports
because it was added as a floor amendment and received only limited dis-
cussion prior to enactment.9 8 Consequently, although the question of con-
Another district court also found the Small Business Act, supra, sufficient congressional authority
to justify rejecting a constitutional attack on an Army Corps of Engineers small business set-aside
program. Taylor v. Marsh, No. 81-H-1203E (N.D. Ala. Aug. 20, 1981). Another challenge to this
program remains in court. Valley Constr. Co. v. Marsh, 714 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1983) (vacating lower
court holding of mootness and remanding for trial).
96. The Department of Transportation changed one major feature of its set-aside regulations after
the decision in Central Alabama Paving, 499 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Ala. 1980), but before M.C. West,
522 F. Supp. 338 (M.D. Tenn. 1981). In Central Alabama Paving, the court enjoined, inter alia, a
provision of the set-aside regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 23.45(i) (1980), that established a "conclusive
presumption" that if any bidder was able to achieve the goal for minority business enterprise partici-
pation established for a particular contract, then all bidders that did not meet the goal would be
ineligible. 499 F. Supp. at 631-32. After review by the Department of Transportation, this provision
was substantially amended on April 27, 1981 to require a showing only that bidders made "good faith
efforts" to meet the goals for minority participation. 49 C.F.R. § 23.45(h)(2) (1981). For discussion of
this change, see M.C. West, 522 F. Supp. at 339-40.
97. See Motion for Clarification of Preliminary Injunction, Central Alabama Paving, Inc. v. Wal-
lace, 499 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Ala. filed May 12, 1983) (No. 80-358-N). In response, the Govern-
ment argued that the new statute rendered the earlier action moot and that the injunction should
therefore be vacated. Response of Federal Defendants to State Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs'
Motion for Clarification of Preliminary Injunction at 3. The court responded to these submissions by
dissolving its preliminary injunction. Order Dissolving Preliminary Injunction, Central Alabama
Paving, 499 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Ala. July 20, 1983) (No. 80-358-N).
98. Congress enacted the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96
Stat. 2097 (1983) in January 1983. The Act raised the federal tax on gasoline by five cents and
authorized appropriations for highway construction and other transportation related functions. It also
contained a provision directing the Secretary of Transportation to set aside 10% of the amount of
authorized appropriations to be "expended with small business concerns owned and controlled by
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. .. " Id. § 105(0, 96 Stat. 2097, 2100. Section
105(0 reads as follows:
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, not less than 10 per centum of
the amounts authorized to be appropriated under this Act shall be expended with small busi-
ness concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals as
defined by section 8(d) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. section 637(d)) and relevant
subcontracting regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.
Id. Under the relevant provision of the Small Business Act, the category "socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals" is presumed to include "Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native
Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities .... " 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C) (1982).
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gressional authorization was resolved by explicit legislation, this legisla-
To be included within the category of "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals," non-
minority persons must receive the specific approval of the Small Business Administration. Id. Conse-
quently, although it does so by some indirection, the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, supra, is
aimed at providing special opportunities to members of the same racial and ethnic minorities explicitly
mentioned in the minority set-aside provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub.L.
95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977), upheld in Fullilove.
This more recent provision originated in the House of Representatives as a floor amendment by
Representative Mitchell (D. Md.), 128 CONt;. REC. H8954 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1982), principal spon-
sor of the 1977 set-aside. There are several other similarities between the two enactments. The new
set-aside was passed without prior committee hearings or reports. The legislative history of the Sur-
face Transportation Assistance Act, supra, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NF.WS 3639, is silent
on the set-aside provision. The only legislative history is a brief floor statement by Representative
Mitchell indicating that the provision was designed, like the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,
supra, to be a "set aside for small and . . . disadvantaged businesses. . . to insure the participation
of the businesses in these massive public spendings." 128 CONG. REC. H8954 (daily ed. Dec. 6,
1982). Rep. Mitchell went on to express concern about the "disproportionate unemployment enjoyed
by minorities" and his fear that, without the set-aside, the "twin forces of racism and economic dis-
crimination will once again raise their ugly heads," and exclude blacks and other minorities from the
"employment rejuvenation program" contemplated by the Surface Transportation Assistance Act. Id.
He stated that the program was projected to "create nearly 300,000 jobs." Id. In support of his
amendment, Rep. Mitchell made explicit reference to the fact that his earlier set-aside proposal had
been upheld by the Supreme Court, though he did not mention Fullilove by name:
I would simply like to indicate that, based on the experience of the Public Works Act of 1977,
the amendment met with enormous success. There was a test as to its constitutionality. The
Supreme Court in 1980 upheld the constitutionality of it. That is all we are dealing with, is a
set-aside for small and disadvantaged businesses in this amendment.
Id. He added that, as a result of that program, "[olver $600 million were awarded to minority busi-
nesses" and "many jobs for the minority population" were created. Id.
After House passage, the set-aside provision went to conference without any formal action by the
Senate. The House bill was amended in conference to grant the Secretary of Transportation some
discretion in implementing the set-aside provision. The Act became law on January 6, 1983. Pub. L.
No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097 (1983).
The Department of Transportation published a notice of proposed rulemaking with respect to
§ 105(f) of the Small Business Act on February 28, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 8416 (1983) (to be codified at
49 C.F.R. pt. 23). A final rule was published on July 21, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,432 (1983) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 23). These regulations, like those promulgated pursuant to the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977, supra, contain provisions for obtaining waivers of the 10% goal, procedures
for challenging businesses claiming to be minority enterprises, and definitions of "socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged individuals." See generally, Participation by Minority Business Enterprises
in Department of Transportation Programs, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,436-40 (1983). The final rule also
retained a "rebuttable presumption" contained in the February 28, 1983 notice of proposed rule-
making, that "Black-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, and members of the other groups" were "so-
cially and economically disadvantaged." Id. at 33,435. The Department of Transportation included
this provision based in part upon the Department of Justice's advice that "in the event of a legal
challenge to section 105(0, a conclusive presumption will be more difficult to defend." Id. Other
persons, including women, may be added to this category on a case-by-case basis. Id. In this regard,
the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, supra, differs markedly from the legislation challenged in
Fullilove. In Fullilove, members of the mentioned racial and ethnic groups benefited from a conclu-
sive statutory presumption that entitled them to the 10% set-aside provision, irrespective of whether
they were "socially and economically disadvantaged." In fact, one district court found this feature of
the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, supra, a basis for declaring the Act unconstitutional as
applied to Native Americans who were, it contended, "indistinguishable in name, skin color, dress,
and use of language from their non-Indian neighbors." Montana Contractors' Ass'n v. Secretary of
Commerce, 460 F. Supp. 1174, 1178 (D. Mont. 1978). The constitutionality of the Surface Transpor-
tation Assistance Act, supra, is currently the subject of federal court challenges by non-minority con-
tractors. Carpenter v. Dole, No. 85-527-CN-5 (E.D.N.C. filed May 17, 1985); Tennessee Asphalt
Co. v. Farris, No. 3-85-1176 (M.D. Tenn. filed Oct. 4, 1985). The Act is also being challenged in
Groves & Sons Co. v. Fulton County, No. C82-1895A (N.D. Ga. filed Sept. 30, 1985) in which the
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tion did nothing to explain what practices Congress viewed as
discriminatory, or why Congress determined that a ten percent set-aside
was the appropriate response. The Agency, therefore, was still at sea with
respect to the precise nature of the policy it was directed to enforce.99
Fullilove clearly focused on the constitutionality of a congressionally
mandated set-aside program. However, the fact was not lost upon states
and localities that only Chief Justice Burger, and perhaps Justice White,
thought it dispositive that the set-aside emanated from Congress.' 00 The
other opinions making up the majority include tests that would appear to
apply to similar enactments by governmental bodies other than Con-
gress.10 1 Indeed, even Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens, in dissent,
evidently do not hold states to higher. standards than those applicable to
Congress.' 02 Based upon this reasoning, states and localities have initiated
a variety of set-aside programs modeled more or less on the federal pro-
gram upheld in Fullilove.10 3
Justice Powell explicitly reserved judgment on whether he would find
set-asides constitutional if they were established by governmental bodies
court has held that the county was not authorized by state law to establish a minority set-aside.
However, based upon the county's claim that the program at issue was required by the Department of
Transportation, the court directed that the agency be joined as a "necessary party" under FED. R.
Civ. P. 19 and brought into the litigation.
99. Congress has also included set-asides in foreign affairs legislation without many preliminaries.
A recent amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 98-151, 97 Stat. 964, 970-71
(1983), reads as follows:
Minority Set-Aside
Except to the extent that the Administrator of the Agency for International Development de-
termines otherwise, not less than 10 percent of the aggregate of the funds made available for
the fiscal year 1984 to carry out chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall
be made available only for activities of economically and socially disadvantaged enterprises
(within the meaning of section 133(c)(5) of the International Development and Food Assis-
tance Act of 1977), historically Black colleges and universities, and private and voluntary orga-
nizations which are controlled by individuals who are Black Americans, Hispanic Americans,
or Native Americans, or who are economically and socially disadvantaged (within the meaning
of section 133(c)(5) (B) and (C) of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of
1977). For purposes of this section, economically and socially disadvantaged individuals shall
be deemed to include women.
Id. The Foreign Assistance Act set-aside provision was extended into the 1985 fiscal year. Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 127, 98 Stat. 1891 (1984).
100. The Chief Justice acknowledged that the Court faced its "gravest and most delicate duty" in
passing on the constitutionality of an act of Congress. Fudlilove, 448 U.S. at 472 (quoting Blodget v.
Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)). Even where the legislation employed ethnic or racial criteria, as
did the minority business enterprise provision, it was the Court's responsibility, the Chief Justice said,
to examine the act closely but with "appropriate deference to the Congress. . . ." Id. He pointed out
that the Court was passing "not on a choice made by ... a school board, but on a considered decision
of the Congress and the President," id. at 473, implying that his position would be different were
action by a governmental entity other than Congress at issue. Chief Justice Burger found it "funda-
mental that in no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive
remedial power than in the Congress . . . ." Id. at 483.
101. 448 U.S. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
102. Id. at 523-24 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 548 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. See supra note 10 for a listing of these programs.
HeinOnline -- 96 Yale L.J. 474 1986-1987
Fullilove
other than Congress. 10 4 He observed in this regard that "[t]he degree of
specificity required in the findings of discrimination and the breadth of
discretion in the choice of remedies may vary with the nature and author-
ity of a governmental body."'05 Yet state and municipal bodies establish-
ing set-asides have not heeded this caution. Nor have courts passing on the
constitutionality of state and local set-asides found these distinctions to be
of much significance. 108 Rather, the prevailing view seems to be that be-
104. Justice Powell declined to answer the question whether "a set-aside always will be an ap-
propriate remedy" even where Congress is concerned, or whether "the selection of a set-aside by any
other governmental body would be constitutional." 448 U.S. at 515-16 n.14 (Powell, J., concurring).
105. Id.
106. Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, for example, placed stringent limitations upon the use of
racial criteria by the state. He concluded that these requirements could not be met by the Regents of
the University of California. Justice Powell held that the goal of "ameliorating, or eliminating where
feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination" could serve as a compelling justification for
using a racial criterion. 438 U.S. at 307. However, a program directed toward this end must be based,
he added, upon "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory viola-
tions." Id. Finally, Justice Powell rejected the notion that all governmental entities could make consti-
tutionally adequate findings of discrimination. "[Ilsolated segments of our vast governmental struc-
tures" were not competent, in his view, to make decisions about the existence and need to remedy
discrimination "at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria."
Id. at 309. Because the Regents of the University of California were such an "isolated segment,"
Justice Powell rejected the Regents' argument that the Davis Medical School minority admissions
plan was designed to remedy discrimination. Id. at 305-10.
The Brennan group (Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun) took the absolute position
in Bakke that states have the power to remedy discrimination by employing racial criteria. According
to their analysis, states can "voluntarily accomplish under § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment what
Congress under § 5 . . .validly may authorize or compel either the States or private persons to do."
Id. at 368. These Justices argued, further, that states have the competence to advance the fundamental
purpose of equal opportunity to which the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Acts are
addressed. States' actions that do not frustrate federal policy are constitutional in the absence of con-
gressional preemption of the subject matter. Finally, the Brennan group noted in Bakke that states
have been declared competent to act beyond the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment (reaching
private parties, for example) to eradicate discrimination. Id. at 368 n.44. Disagreeing with Justice
Powell, the Brennan group took the position that the competence of state governmental entities should
not be a matter of constitutional moment: "T]he manner in which a State chooses to delegate govern-
mental functions is for it to decide." Id. at 366 n.42.
Most courts passing on set-asides have adopted the Brennan group's analysis in Bakke that institu-
tional competence is a matter of state law. See, e.g., South Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Con-
tractors of Am., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846, 852 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 220 (1984); Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 662 F.2d 550, 558 (9th Cir. 1981);
Arrington v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 403 So. 2d 893, 902 (Ala. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
913 (1982).
State law analysis of institutional competence has turned in many instances on the courts' reading
of relevant state bidding laws, which generally require that contracts be awarded to the "lowest re-
sponsible bidder." Some courts have construed such provisions to prohibit considerations other than
the amount of the bid and the minimum qualifications of the bidder in terms of financial ability and
skills needed to complete the job successfully. See, e.g., Arrington, 403 So. 2d 893, and Georgia
Branch, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Atlanta, 253 Ga. 397, 321 S.E.2d 3125 (1984). Others have
defined "responsible" to include concepts of social responsibility such as affirmative action. See, e.g.,
Southwest Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 115,
667 P.2d 1092, 1096 (1983).
Other courts have attempted to locate competence within the Constitution. See, e.g., Ohio Contrac-
tors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 1983) (equal protection clause); Southwest Wash.
Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 121-22, 667 P.2d 1092,
1099 (1983) (state police power analogous to commerce power).
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cause Fullilove upheld Congress' enactment of a minority set-aside with-
out any contemporaneous legislative hearings, committee reports or debate
justifying its action, other governmental entities may act in an equally
summary manner.
10 7
Hence, it is not surprising that most state and municipal set-asides have
survived court challenges. In their treatment of set-asides, reviewing
courts have been highly deferential to governmental claims that racial dis-
crimination existed and that it warranted remedial steps. Relying upon
Fullilove, courts have concluded, with respect to set-aside programs, that
least restrictive means were not required, that the percentages of business
set-aside for minorities or women were goals rather than impermissible
quotas, that the percentages were reasonable in view of relevant popula-
tion figures, and that the programs were sufficiently flexible to prevent
illegal or unconstitutional treatment of non-minority or male-run business
enterprises.108
Courts passing on the constitutionality of these programs have avoided
107. Michigan Road Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. Milliken, 571 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Mich. 1983),
exemplifies this mode of analysis. The court in Milliken stated that "the Legislature need not make
specific findings of past discrimination .... " Id. at 178 (citation omitted). The decision explains
that because the Michigan legislature is the "ultimate policy-making body of the State and the nature
of the decision-making process in the legislative setting is analogous to that of Congress, it may rely
upon any evidence which logically supports the inference of prior discrimination." Id.
See also South Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 552 F. Supp. 909, 914-16 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (series of studies conducted following May 1980
Liberty City civil disturbances, but no fact-finding hearings held by county commission), modified,
723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 220 (1984); Pierce County, 667 P.2d at 1100
n.2 ("Local legislative bodies, which necessarily operate on a smaller and more informal scale, cannot
be expected to undertake the expense of detailed recordkeeping comparable to that of Congress, which
operates on a national scale.").
In contrast to the acceptance of more generalized evidence of discrimination in the cases discussed
above, the court concluded in Schmidt that the findings required by Justice Powell's Fullilove opinion
had been made by the Oakland School District, which conducted public hearings as well as numerous
meetings with construction industry representatives. 662 F.2d at 558-59. Accord Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. 334, 340-41 (N.D. Cal.
1985).
The Alabama Supreme Court in Arrington, 403 So. 2d 893 (1981), took a stricter view of what is
required in the way of findings, concluding that Birmingham's set-aside ordinance should be struck
down because it was not "the considered response to hearings, reports, debates, or empirical studies."
Id. at 902.
108. See, e.g., Milliken, 571 F. Supp. at 187-90 (burden on non-minority contractors was slight;
appropriate safeguards concerning verification of minority enterprises, but no waiver or durational
limit); Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d at 853-54 (no overall percentage goal, waiver provisions,
or durational limits; nonetheless, several-tiered approval process for set-aside held to be sufficient
safeguard); Keip, 713 F.2d at 175 (no durational limit, but Ohio General Assembly, being "necessa-
rily alert to the desires of a majority of the electorate," would not "permit the set-asides for minority
contractors to continue beyond the time required to achieve the goal of an equal opportunity for
minorities to share in the business of the state").
But see Arrington, 403 So. 2d at 903-04 (set-aside not narrowly drawn because minorities other
than blacks were included; no time limit, written regulations or guidelines; no evidence adduced that
10% minority business enterprise set-aside had any relation to number of minority contractors availa-
ble and equipped to do city construction work).
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the crucial issues, namely the nature of the discrimination to be remedied,
and the evidence upon which the finding of discrimination must be made.
Having allowed the proponents of set-aside programs to offer only the
most generalized evidence in support of the existence of discrimination,
courts have hardly been in a position, thereafter, to question the constitu-
tionality of the attendant percentages and implementation provisions.
V. A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO MINORITY SET-ASIDES
In view of this history of legislative and judicial inattention to the seri-
ous constitutional and public policy questions raised by the use of minor-
ity set-asides, one may ask whether there is any reason for allowing such
programs to continue. Even if one accepts that congressionally mandated
set-asides are not held to Justice Stevens' specific procedural and substan-
tive criteria, is there any basis for granting states and localities similar
authority? Unlike Congress, they are not explicitly authorized by section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment "to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions" of that amendment. Are not the risks to "values of perma-
nent significance" increased dangerously by allowing lower levels of gov-
ernment to establish explicit racial classifications?
These are weighty concerns. There are, however, considerations on the
other side of the balance that argue in favor of retaining minority set-
asides as an option for governmental agencies in remedying the effects of
racial discrimination in our society. For one, there is reason to believe that
the effects of discrimination against minority and female business enter-
prises continue to limit the ability of these firms to compete effectively.
Pervasive employment discrimination in the construction trades, for exam-
ple, has prevented minorities from following the traditional path from la-
borer to entrepreneur." 9 If adoption of a set-aside program is preceded by
a searching inquiry into the nature of discrimination and into remedial
alternatives, and if the program is designed to alleviate a history of dis-
criminatory disadvantage, I see no reason why this form of government
action should be prohibited.
Additionally, with respect to state and local governments, we must be
mindful that the federal government alone cannot be expected to eradicate
racial discrimination in America."' Public institutions at all levels must
109. See H. Hi.L, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: RACE, WORK, AND THE
LAW 235-47 (1977).
110. Commitment to civil rights enforcement at the federal level has varied from administration to
administration. Even under the most committed leadership, however, resources have fallen far below
the levels necessary to enforce federal civil rights laws effectively. Consequently, federal officials have
viewed private enforcement as essential to the civil rights effort. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 708 n.42 (1979); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1086 n.2 (5th Cir.
1980) (federal agencies urge courts to find implied private rights of action in civil rights statutes
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contribute to the effort. They are often in a better position to identify the
effects of racial discrimination and to tailor corrective programs than is
Congress. They should not be disqualified from this endeavor; rather, they
should be required to proceed in a fashion that reduces the chances of
irresponsible action to an acceptable minimum. Courts' efforts to compel
such heightened accountability should focus on three factors that bear on
the propriety of state and local set-aside programs: competence, findings,
and means.
A. Competence
It has been argued that some governmental institutions ought to be
viewed as constitutionally incompetent to establish race-conscious pro-
grams because they are not equipped to identify and develop remedies for
racial discrimination."1 ' This is peculiar reasoning. The law already holds
states, localities and their respective instrumentalities accountable for
identifying and remedying their discriminatory practices.11 If they are le-
gally competent to stand trial, they should also be legally competent to
take action that would obviate the necessity for a trial. This presumption
ought to operate in the context of race-conscious remedial action.113 Those
states, municipalities, and governmental agencies such as school boards,
that have already established set-asides, might best be regarded as having
had competence to do so. Judicial inquiry into future programs ought to
prohibiting sex discrimination in education and discrimination against disabled persons), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 889 (1980).
111. In Fullilove, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist took the position that even Congress was insti-
tutionally incompetent in this regard. See supra text accompanying note 74. In Bakke, however, Jus-
tice Powell took the more limited position discussed above, see supra note 106, that "isolated segments
of our vast governmental structures are not competent to make those decisions [about the existence of
and need to remedy discrimination], at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively
determined criteria." 438 U.S. at 309.
112. A school board, for example, bears a continuing duty to remedy unconstitutional racial segre-
gation even in the absence of a judicial finding of violation. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449, 458 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979).
Professor Tribe has provided a thoughtful analysis of what he calls the "structural concerns" about
institutional competence voiced by Justice Powell in Bakke. Tribe questions whether those concerns
"truly justified his decision to invalidate the Davis program." Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal
Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural Justice? 92 HARV. L. REv. 864, 873-77 (1979); see
also Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review, and Prophecy, 8 DAYTON L. REV. 809, 817-24
(1983) (extended discussion of "structural review" and critique of Justice Powell's approach in
Bakke).
113. One can conceive of a case in which the presumption fails. Take, for example, the way in
which we treat courts of limited jurisdiction. Our judicial system often provides for trials de novo in
the event that the initial court's decision is challenged, because we recognize that such proceedings are
not necessarily presided over by legally-trained officers, that the hearings often lack the full panoply
of procedural safeguards available at higher levels in the system, and that the courts operate on rela-
tively meager budgets. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 112-20 (1972). In the event that a
government agency characterized by similar deficiencies established a set-aside plan, the presumption
of competence would have to vanish.
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focus on whether the governmental entity creating the set-aside is acting
within its "sphere of authority."'" Hence, a school board's decision to
rectify the absence of minority contractors in its own public works pro-
gram should raise no constitutional difficulties. Were a school board, how-
ever, to attempt to address problems facing minority contractors generally
(at the national or state level, for example), it would raise questions about
the board's competence to act with respect to matters outside its "sphere of
authority."
In addition, the political sensitivity of set-asides has raised concern that
they ought to be established only by elected, not appointed bodies.115 This
would ensure, in the first instance, that the programs were subject to
proper public debate and consideration. Appointed bodies with authority
to establish set-asides, however, are likely to be subject to the same public-
meeting requirements applicable to elected agencies.11" Although it might
also be argued that programs established by elected bodies would receive
greater public support because they were instituted by citizens' direct rep-
resentatives, this assertion runs counter to the proposition that however
responsibility is allocated between elected and appointed entities, all pub-
lic officials are ultimately accountable to the electorate.11 7 The fact that
race-conscious programs are involved is no reason, in and of itself, to de-
part from this premise, particularly because the effect would almost cer-
tainly be to thwart governmental efforts to devise effective remedies for
discrimination.
There is a final point to be made about institutional competence. The
last decade has witnessed a significant increase in the number of black and
other minorities holding elected office. Implementation of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 has spurred this change. Black mayors now serve in
Philadelphia, Richmond, New Orleans, Newark, Atlanta, Chicago, and
Los Angeles, to name only a few cities.11 Both San Antonio and Denver
114. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (judicial deference re-
quired to legislature acting within sphere of authority).
115. See, e.g., A. SINDLER, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: ON THE POLICY AND POLITICS OF COMPEN-
SATORY MINORITY PREFERENCES 16-20 (American Enterprise Institute Studies in Legal Policy,
1983) (advocating involvement of elected officials); Note, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Action
in Public Employment: Judicial Deference to Certain Politically Responsible Bodies, 67 VA. L. REV.
1235 (1981) (urging greater judicial deference to affirmative action programs instituted by political
bodies directly or indirectly responsible to public).
116. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
1079-80 (1979).
117. For a discussion of the various "countermajoritarian" forces that affect governmental action
and the benefits that may flow therefrom, see Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE
L.J. 486, 488-92 (1982); see also Tushnet, supra note 112, at 822-23. But see Chase, The Left on
Rights: An Introduction, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1541 (1984) (thorough critique of traditional "representa-
tive-democracy" theories).
118. See P. ESINGER, THE POLITICS OF DISPLACEMENT: RACIAL AND ETHNIC TRANSITION IN
THREE AMERICAN CITIES 147-68 (1980).
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have Hispanic mayors. Many cities with minority mayors and a signifi-
cant minority presence on their city councils have instituted race-conscious
remedial programs such as set-asides." 9
These developments have prompted at least two commentators to sug-
gest that "courts must scrutinize somewhat more carefully those [affirma-
tive action] programs instituted by decisionmakers of the minority
race." 20 This suggestion rests on the view that less is at risk when race-
conscious plans favoring minorities are instituted by governmental bodies
controlled by whites. There is no reason to fear, the argument runs, that
whites will discriminate against themselves, whereas minority officials
may not exercise such self-restraint when adopting programs that disad-
vantage whites.121 This logic elevates form over substance. 22 There is
every reason to expect, in the absence of the safeguards which this Article
advocates, that set-asides lacking remedial justification are just as likely to
be instituted by white as by minority officials.
B. Findings
As I have already discussed, the Fullilove majority settled for a very
meager factual record, despite its demand that findings of discrimination
justify the creation of set-asides. The same uncritical attitude is reflected
in subsequent lower court opinions passing on state and local set-asides.
Government agencies establishing set-asides should be held to a higher
standard than at present, although they should not have to satisfy the pro-
cedural and evidentiary requirements demanded of courts or administra-
tive tribunals engaged in resolving specific discrimination claims. 2 State
and local agencies creating set-asides should, for example, be able to rely
in part upon federal legislative or agency findings and judicial determina-
tions regarding nationwide discrimination against minority business enter-
prises as predicates for considering the propriety of set-asides in their re-
spective jurisdictions. But it is essential that state and local agencies also
119. Atlanta, Birmingham, and Richmond are examples. See supra note 10.
120. Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CH. L. REv. 213, 236
(1980); Note, supra note 115, at 1247 n.82.
121. Wright, supra note 120, at 236. Wright cites Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination, 41 U. CH. L. REv. 723, 735 (1974), an influential discussion of this issue, as the
starting point for his theory. Wright, supra note 120, at 234; see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 16-21, at 1043-46 (1978).
122. A racial minority group may discriminate against its own members. Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482 (1977) (petitioner allegedly discriminated against Mexican-Americans in empanelling
grand jury). One segment of the white community may discriminate against another, less politically
powerful segment of that same majority. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 168-79 (1977)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part) (legislature allegedly diluted voting strength of white petitioners
through redistricting).
123. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (discussion of burdens of
proof in individual employment discrimination cases).
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establish the presence of discrimination in their own bailiwicks, based ei-
ther upon their own fact-finding processes or upon determinations made
by other competent institutions, such as courts and administrative
agencies.
Requiring that discrimination be identified is one thing; describing
what remediable discrimination must look like is quite another. Without
attempting to exhaust the universe, one can point to examples of what
ought to be probative. Although statistics play a necessary role in the in-
quiry, significant disparities between the percentage of minority members
among all contractors as compared with the general minority population
in a state or municipality, standing alone, would not provide a sufficient
basis for the implementation of a set-aside program. To be sure, courts
have taken the position, in the employment context, that such disparities
are probative of discrimination - at least when the minimal requirements
necessary for employment support the presumption that the work force
should be "more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition
of the population in the community" at large.124 In cases where the jobs in
question require qualifications not possessed by the general polpulation,
however, this presumption has not been entertained." 5 Because govern-
ment contracting falls into this latter category, the relevant question is
whether there is a significant disparity between the percentage of minority
contractors eligible12 to handle government contracts and their percentage
representation among those actually bidding for or awarded such
contracts.
Agencies should also consider the extent to which government con-
tracting practices have been intentionally discriminatory. Were minority
contractors systematically denied information about the existence of con-
tracts upon which they could bid, about schedules associated with the bid-
ding process, or about the availability of financial or technical assistance
that would facilitate their participation? Have such contractors been de-
nied contracts for which they were the lowest bidders consistent with ap-
plicable criteria? Intentional discrimination by non-minority contractors
also is relevant. If, for example, government agencies find that prime or
major contractors to whom they traditionally award contracts consistently
refuse to hire minority subcontractors, reasonable grounds exist for acting
to remedy that situation.
124. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977).
125. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-09 (1977) (relevant comparison
in employment of public school teachers is between percentage of minorities on teaching staff and
percentage in pool of qualified teachers).
126. "Eligible" minority business enterprises would have the minimum qualifications in terms of
financial ability and skills needed to complete government contracts successfully, taking into considera-
tion problems such firms may encounter in obtaining bonding and financing.
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Intent, however, is not a necessary factor. Our experience under the
modern civil rights statutes has taught us that institutions often engage in
practices that, while not discriminatory in and of themselves, unnecessa-
rily reinforce and perpetuate patterns of racial injustice.127 This lesson
should not be ignored in the context of public contracting. Governments
should attempt to identify practices such as excessive bonding or experi-
ence requirements that have had discriminatory effects on minority con-
tractors. 2 " Evidence of such practices, too, may supply reasons for reme-
dial action.
But what does it mean to say that there is evidence of discrimination
against "minorities?" One of the major flaws in the set-aside upheld in
Fullilove, one that subsequent federal, state and local programs have rep-
licated, is that the record did not explain why six racial
groups-"Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and
Aleuts"-were selected to receive the ten percent preference. 2 One can
imagine that, had Congress given due deliberation to the subject, it might
have concluded that at least four of these groups deserved to be included
in the nationwide set-aside program. Certainly there is no need to recite
the record of discriminatory practices nationwide directed against blacks,
Hispanics, Asians and Indians in employment and business. There may
well be sufficient evidence to conclude that Aleuts and Eskimos have ex-
perienced similar treatment in areas where they live in large numbers.
But it requires far more to justify the inclusion of all or most of these
groups in any state or local government set-aside program. Such programs
leave one with the sense that the racial and ethnic groups favored by the
set-aside were added without attention to whether their inclusion was jus-
tified by evidence of past or present discrimination. 3 Similar questions
arise over the inclusion of women's business enterprises in set-aside pro-
127. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) (discriminatory impact of
employment tests upon blacks resulting, in part, from inferior education they received in segregated
public schools violates Title VII absent business necessity). Likewise, Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1856 (1986), views statistical evidence of
discrimination as a "reliable benchmark" in determining whether race-conscious remedies are appro-
priate. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed its acceptance of statistical proof of discrimination.
See Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000, 3007-11 (1986) (upholding multiple regression analyses).
128. See R. GI.OVER, MINORITY ENTERPRISE IN CONSTRUCTION 57-61 (1977) (bonding re-
quirements may bar minority businesses from large contracts); INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
WOMEN BUSINESS OWNERS, THE BOTTOM LINE: UNEQUAL ENTERPRISE IN AMERICA 89-96 (1978)
(regulatory barriers facing women business owners); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MINORI-
TIES AND WOMEN AS GOVERNMENT CONTRACrORS 16-28 (May 1975) (obstacles facing minority
and female-owned firms in government contracting).
129. Indeed, neither Congress nor the Court could explain how "Spanish-speaking" could be
regarded as a racial or ethnic group. Justices Stewart and Stevens found the inclusion of these six
groups in the Public Works Employment Act to be a serious constitutional flaw. Fullilove, 448 U.S.
at 530 n.12 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 537-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. For example, Richmond, Virginia's set-aside program includes these six groups. See supra
note 10.
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grams.131 Of course, women have also been the victims of pervasive dis-
crimination in our society.132 Although women may have made significant
strides in gaining access to employment and the professions, they continue
to confront the effects of discrimination, both past and present, in estab-
lishing and operating business enterprises.1 3  Nevertheless, initiators of
set-aside programs should have the burden of demonstrating a nexus be-
tween their findings of past and present discrimination and the groups
that are to be afforded and denied preferences under such programs.
13 4
C. Means
Inquiries into evidence of discrimination of the type just described may
reveal that, at least in some jurisdictions, there is no basis for a finding of
past discrimination, or that the effects of discrimination have disappeared
with the passage of time or through other intervening events. But where
discrimination that warrants remedial action is found, the question of the
appropriate means cannot be avoided. I can see no good reason to require
government agencies in this position to experiment with remedies that do
not involve explicit racial classifications if these remedies offer no likeli-
hood of success. Agencies should, however, demonstrate that these lesser
alternatives were systematically and thoroughly explored prior to being
rejected. This exploration may take many forms, including evaluation of
relevant literature, consultation with experts, and assessment of the extent
to which similarly-situated government agencies have found the alterna-
tives effective.
If this review leads the agency to conclude that a minority set-aside
promises to be the most effective solution, the agency must then determine
the percentage size of the set-aside and the duration of the program. For
reasons already discussed, setting the percentages for the program at gen-
eral minority population levels cannot easily be defended as a remedial
131. See Michigan Road Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 571 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (af-
firming race- and sex-based set-asides); Southwest Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v.
Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 667 P.2d 1092 (1983) (en banc) (upholding county's race- and
sex-based set-asides); see also supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text (discussing Department of
Transportation set-aside regulations).
132. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-87 (1973) (discussing history of dis-
crimination against women).
133. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON WOMEN BUSINESS OWNERS, supra note 128, at 4,
23-25, 41-42, 89-95; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 128, at 16-28.
134. It must be kept in mind that whatever the percentage of work set aside for minorities and
women by such programs, the amount is finite. Hence, those entitled to participate are in competition
with each other. Without an inquiry into the degree to which various minority groups and women
have been the victims of discriminatory barriers to participation in government contracting, govern-
mental bodies unfairly oblige those that have suffered most in certain jurisdictions to compete for the
limited opportunities provided by set-asides with others less affected by discrimination.
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measure.13 5 Rather, the levels should initially correspond to the percent-
age of minority contractors within the jurisdiction who are qualified and
available to participate in government projects. These percentages might
then be increased, if findings of discrimination support it, to reflect the
number of minority entrepreneurs who were deterred in the past from
entering the contracting business because of racial barriers, but who are
likely to take advantage of the remedial program."3 ' In any event, the
program should contain explicit provisions for waiver of the specified per-
centages in cases where it can be established that they are unattainable or
unrealistic despite best efforts.
There is no magic time period for the duration of set-aside programs.
As in the case of percentages, the proper number should flow from the
nature of the discrimination to be remedied. Two observations merit em-
phasis. First, any new program needs a reasonable period in operation
before its effectiveness can be assessed realistically.13 7 Second, whatever
the duration initially selected, the program ought to be subject to contin-
ual monitoring and to a comprehensive review at a specified time, accord-
ing to pre-established procedures, before it is renewed or extended. This
review should parallel the inquiry undertaken prior to the program's
adoption.
V1. CONCLUSION
I have offered a general approach to the development of minority set-
asides. It is not an easy one, nor is it meant to be. I recognize that adher-
ence to these criteria may require major changes in the way governments
go about remedying discrimination against minority business enterprises.
Some government agencies may find themselves unable to conduct the nec-
essary inquiries upon which to predicate a set-aside program. Others may
conclude that there is no identifiable discrimination to be remedied or that
there are preferable alternatives to reliance upon explicit racial criteria.
Still others may conclude that their set-aside programs ought to favor
135. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26. Indeed, a federal Court of Appeals recently held
a city set-aside ordinance unconstitutional because general minority population figures, rather than
ones related to the percentage of qualified minority businesses, were used to determine the size of the
set-aside. J. Edinger & Son, Inc. v. City of Louisville, No. 85-6057 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 1986).
136. The depressive effect of discrimination on the incentives of racial minorities and women to
participate in employment and government programs has been judicially recognized. See, e.g.,
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (employment); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430
U.S. 144, 163-64 (1977) (voting).
137. As one court said in holding that a school district would have to operate its school desegrega-
tion plan for longer than one semester before any determination could be made about whether consti-
tutional requirements were met: "One swallow does not make a spring." Lemon v. Bossier Parish
School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400, 1401 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). This attitude should inform any
evaluation of a set-aside program's effectiveness.
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fewer groups, at lower percentages, for shorter periods than is the current
practice. My sense is that all of these outcomes ought to be encouraged
because they would bring an integrity to the entire undertaking that is
badly needed. I hope this will occur.
It is difficult to criticize the efforts of people of goodwill seeking to rid
our society of its unfortunate legacy of racial discrimination. I would be
the first to argue that minority business set-asides have been proposed,
adopted and judicially sanctioned by people acting out of the very best of
motives. But more than good motives should be required when govern-
ment seeks to allocate its resources by way of an explicit racial classifica-
tion system. It must be shown that such a system is responsive to findings
of racial discrimination, is designed to redress that problem, and is em-
ployed only as long as is necessary to achieve its remedial objective. These
standards were not met by the Public Works Employment Act of 1977.
They were not demanded of Congress by the Supreme Court which up-
held the Act in Fullilove, and they have not characterized subsequent set-
aside programs at any level of government. This is an indefensible state of
affairs that threatens to undermine the principle of affirmative action and
the appropriate use of explicit race-conscious remedies for racial discrimi-
nation.13 It ought to stop.
138. Although this Article has focused on minority enterprise set-aside programs, the failings dis-
cussed in that area find current counterparts in other types of voluntary affirmative action programs.
The minority layoff provision recently pronounced unconstitutional in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986), is a case in point. The school board and two lower federal courts were
insufficiently mindful of the need to link a program designed to ensure proportional layoff of teachers
by race, irrespective of seniority, to evidence of past discrimination, and to tailor its provisions to
remedy that condition. This result is unfortunate because the board probably could have developed a
properly tailored plan that would have survived constitutional attack, Id. at 1863 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Moreover, the school board's inattention to detail probably robbed its efforts of the broad
public support that such programs require to be successful. In this and other areas of voluntary race-
conscious affirmative action, the prescriptions that I have offered with respect to set-asides are equally
applicable.
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